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PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND THEIR APPLICATION
TO STRATEGY AND TACTICS
A lecture delivered by

Captain G. K. Carmichael, USN
at the Naval War College.
August 17, 1950
The task of the Naval War College mission is to further an

understanding of the fundamentals of warfare, with. emphasis on
their application to future naval warfare. Accordingly, it is

my purpose this morning to examine some of the fundamental truths
of war and to indicate how these so-called principles of war are ap
plicable to strategy and tactics.

Although exact definitions of the fields of war-strategy, tac

tics, and logistics-are difficult to arrive at, and may create futile

discussion as to semantic distinctions, some definitions are desirable
as a basis for study and discussion.

The dictionary of U. S. Military Terms for joint usage, issued·

by the .Joint Chiefs of Staff, defines strategy and tactics as follows:

Strategy is defined as : "The art and science of developing and

using the political, economic, psychological, and armed forces of a

nation, during peace and during war, to afford the maximum support

to national policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favor�

able consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat."

scope.

It may be noted that this definition of strategy is broad in
It includes not only the military aspects, but also the politi

cal, economic, and psychological aspects of a nation's conduct, during

Captain Carmichael is a member of the staff of the Naval War College.
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both peace and war.

It has as its. purpose not only the winning· of

war, but also of winning the peace by increasing the favorable con

sequences of victory. In this sense the term is often referred to as
"national strategy", or "grand strategy".

Whfn the term strategy

is restricted to the employment of armed forces it is someti:rµes

spoken of as "military strategy", and it is in this sense that I shall
use the term strategy in this discussion.

Tactics is defined as: One, "The employment of units in com
bat", and two, "The ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in
relation to each other and/or to the enemy."
Recent developments in the scientific field, such as radar, long
range rockets, and guided missiles make it difficult to determine
just when forces may be said to be in contact with the enemy; or

even in combat, and, it becomes diffi�ult to differentiate be

tween strategy and tactics, And, although it may be impossible to

say at just what point the field of strategy, of tactics, or of logis
tics leaves off and another of these fields begins, there are certain
fundamental principles which govern in all three of these fields of
warfare. These are the principles of war-principles which may be

applied to arrive at strategic, tactical or logistical concepts of war.

It has been said that the only thing constant in war is change
itself. Throughout history, new inventions have dictated changes in
strategy, tactics, and logistics. As for naval tactics, we can observe,
for example, how the cannon changed the tactics of ramming and

boarding to one of maneuver.and fire concentration out to the maxi
mum gun range, or how Naval Air has changed the Battle Line con

cept of capping the "T" of the enemy line to the Carrier Task Force

concept of striking a crippling blow against the enemy fleet at the
extreme range of the attack plane.

24
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Let us consider for a moment the ten chief t�ctical principles
ated
by Lord Nelson ,and employed by him with such suc
ul
rm
fo
cess. They are:
1. The principle objective is the complete annihilation of the
enemy's fleet: partial victory is not enough.
2. Concentration of own masses against enemy fractions.
3. A close and decisive action is necessary.
4. Units must support each other and keep close to the enemy.
5. It is necessary for subordinates to know the plans of the com
mander-in-chief, whose principal business is to bring the en
emy to action on the most, advantageous terms.

6. The division of large fleets into squadrons whose commanders , ··
have full discretion.
7. Consideration of the moral qualities of an adversary is an
essential factor.
8. The order of sailing is the order of battle, and the less man
euvering the better.
9. "Time is everything", and simplicity of method is desirable.
10. Victory must be followed up.
The basis of these tactical doctrines is the principles of war
-the principle of the objective, of mass, of the offensive, of man·. euver, of simplicity. However new weapons have dictated changes
in these tactical concepts. No longer is close action necessary to
destroy the enemy, and no longer is the "order of sailing the order
of battle". Thus, it may be seen that, while tactics are fluid and
ever changing, certain fundamental truths or principles .of war are
constant. It is the application of these principles which is.variable,
and not the principles themselves.
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Often strategic and tactical changes have been slow in fol

lowing the development of new weapons. To those nations who have

first shown an appreciation of the strategic and tactical signifi�ance

of. new weapons, there has accrued a distinct, and sometimes, a de
eisive, advantage.

For example, it was many years before the

armies of the world appreciated the tactical significance of the

maneuverability of fire power in the tank, motorized artillery and

infantry, as embodied in the German Panzer Division. Yet, the de-

. cisive role that th� Panzer Division played against the static de
fenses of the Maginot ljne is without question.

Today, :with unparalleled advances in new weapons, it is

essential that we develop new strategic and tactical concepts in or

der to realize the. maximum effectiveness .from the tools available.

Similarly, intelligence as to the developments and techniques of our
possible enemies takes on an added significance.

We must answer such questions as these.

How, and under

Is it to be

what circumstances, should we employ the atom bomb?

used primarily in a strategic or a tactical sense?

enemy use the bomb?

How may the

What active and what passive defense

measures should we employ against the A bomb threat?

From a

positions for cruising, for battle, for amphibious assault?

And the

Naval tactical viewpoint, what changes must we make in our dis

same type of study must be given to the implications of the many

. other new developments-the jet plane, the rocket, the guided
missile, and the true submersible.

In early 1939 the old battleships

New York and Texas were

given what is now called radar equipment for full sca1e test afloat.

It was
.

then a secret weapon in the development
test stage.
· The
.
.

implications of this new weapon were enormous.
ported on along these lines:

It

It

was re-

is the greatest invention since the

26
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advent of radio; it wilf revolutionize naval gunnery and tactics. It
was recommended that an immediate procurement program should

be initiated to equip at the earliest possible time all battleships,
carriers, and cruisers. As we review that report today, it was
prophetic. And, yet, someone a1ong the line was slow in appreciating
the urgency and soundness of those recommendations and decided

to con tract for only_ six (6) equipments to be installed in cruisers
for further test and evaluation. Thus, a year or so, was largely

lost, iilf period of an impending crisis, during which we could have
equipped a major portion of our fleet with radar, developed our
technique, and trained our personnel in its employment and main
tenance.

I cite thi.s example for two reasons; first to emphasize the

enormous importance of adjusting

quickly our tactical concepts to·

new weapons; and secondly, to indicate that there are times when a
new weapon should be expoited when it is a serviceable one-with"

out waiting for the technical people and the scientists to produce
what they consider to be a perfect, or near perfect, instrument. There
are other times, however, when new weapons should not be employed

until they are available in quantity. This will be indicated in later
discussion.

It is possible to find many instances of the technical bureaus' ·
keeping a weapon in the test stages long after it was serviceable,
searching for this or that answer-which might well have come
sooner if it had been put into service and given operational field
tests. We might now do more toward getting the bugs out of some
of our guided missiles, for example, and, certainly we could do more
toward developing strategic and tactical concepts as how best to
employ them if they were put into production now and gotten out to
the operating forces. Time may be running out. And it takes time
to develop techniques and train in the employment, servicing, and
maintenance of new weapons.

RESTRICTED
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950

27
5

Naval War College Review, Vol. 3 [1950], No. 8, Art. 3

RESTRICTED
Korea should prove an excellent testing ground for new

weapons and new strategic and tactical

weapons.

concepts

based on such

To so make it, a deliberate and studied program should

be initiated.

The opportunity we have there is analogous to that

which Germany utilized so effectively in Spain prior to World
War II.

Our tactical concepts today are largely those of World War

II and need close examination and study to adapt them to the ne"".
weapons being developed.

It is a real

c hallenge

to

c ondition

our

minds, not to World War II but to World War III concepts. It is not

enough in solving military problems to dive into USF2 or USF4 or
FMlOl-10 and come up with an answer.

Use them, yes; but, by all

means, try to devise something better than cruising disposition 4C

or battle disposition 4M-something which

considers

the new

weapons we have, and those which the enemy is likely to have.
Now what to use as a basis for these new

c oncepts?

The

Principles of War. They are based on all of military history and

have stood the test of some revolutonary weapon developments

and radical concepts of how to employ weapons.

Before presenting them, a few words of .caution

their application are in order.

concerning

They should not be considered as if

they were religious tenets, but rather as guides in planning and ex

ecuting military operations. The correct application of any one, or

several of them, will not assure success, particularly when, at the
same time, another of the principles is violated.

In fact, the correct

application of all of the principles may not assure success providing

the morale forces are lacking.
cipline,

The human elements-morale, dis

leadership-are so vital to success that they deserve our

first and uninterrupted attention.

You will recall that according to

Napoleon "Moral force is to the physical as three to one."

28
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is always present the danger of becoming so engros&ed in the theory,
art, or science of war (whatever you choose to call it) that the
human factors are lost sight of, the initiative restricted, or the
imagination dam�ened. There is also the danger of making the as
sumption that these principles are all inclusive and offer a magic
formula to resolve any military problem. A military commander
must resolve for himself what the principles of war imply, and how
they should be applied.
']Clausewitz, a century ago, included the "gaining of public
opinion", as one of the three fundamental objectives in war. It is
probably just as important today-if not more so-than it was 100
years ago, but to my knowledge it is not included in any present
day listings of the principles of war. Nevertheless, one should exer
cise in the application of the fundamentals of war in studying mili
tary history and in the solution of military problems, until their
use becomes second nature. In the heat of battle, application of
these principles should be subsconscfous, not self-conscious.
Currently the Army Command and Staff School lists nine
principles of war of the United States Army. The principles are:

1.

The Objective.

2.

The Offensive.

3. Mass.
4.

Maneuver.

5. Surprise.
6. Security.

7. Economy of Forces;
8.

Unity of Command.

9. _ Simplicity.
RESTRICTED
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Although you will not find the principles of war listed in

any of the USF publications, as such, you will find the funda
mental truths embodied in these principles in the doctrine and
instructions contained in the Fleet Publications.

The War Manual of the Royal Navy lists a total of ten prin

ciples of war, which are, for the most part; identical to those taught

in the U. S. Army.

They do not, however, include Simplicity;

instead they list Maintenance of Morale and Administration.

Using the Command and Staff School list I shall make a few
comments on each of the principles, with particular emphasis on
their application to naval strategy and tactics.

OBJECTIVE
If any of the principles may be said to be more important

than the others, that one is the principle of the objective.

certainly fundamental, for it defines . the. mission or the aim.

It is

From the national strategic level it defines our national ob
jective or aim. In war it implies the imposition of our nation's
will upon that of the enemy. From the level of high military
strategy it implies the imposition of our will by destruction of his
will to resist, and normally, but not necessarily, entails the des
truction of a large portion of his armed forces.

At every level of command the proper selection of the ob

jective is of the greatest importance.

Properly, it should be one

which supports the objective or mission of the next higher level.

An excellent example of maintenance of the objective, (and

I might say here that the British call this principle "Selection and

. 30
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Maintenance of the Aim" rather than simply the Objective) is

Admiral Spruance's action in defending the landing operations in
the Marianas against naval air and naval surface attack instead of
rushing out to meet the oncoming Japanese Fleet.

The primary

mission was an offensive one-the seizure of the Marianas. That
mission could be best accomplished by isolating the objective area

Admir.al
and defending against any incursion by the enemy.
Spruance, keeping in mind the primary mission, took a course of
actio1½ which. would most nearly assure that mission being ac
complished.

Generally, in a naval engagement the tactical objective may

be con�idered to be that part of the enemy's sea-air forces which
has been selected for destruction or neutralization. By. tactical

maneuvers one's major forces should be brought to bear on that

part of the enemy's which it is important to overwhelm, the Bat

tle of Midway is a · splendid example of a proper selection of the

physical objective.

Although the Japanese troop ships were

tempting targets, the carriers were the main threat and were
therefore chosen as the primary objective.

OFFENSIVE
This principle stems from an aggressive state of mind or a

will to destroy the enemy.

It

is characterized by a desire on the

part of the Commander and his subordinates to get at the enemy

and to destroy him.

Nelson embodied that spirit in his tactics of

closing the enemy and annihilating him.

It

entails an assumption

of the initiative and of denying the initiative to the enemy.

The principle of the offensive does not imply that the de

fensive should be ignored.

Clausewit� contends that the defense

is · "the stronger form of warfare" and that therefore a weaker foe
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has a fair chance of assisting a more powerful one.

Passive de

fense measures, such as assuming tactical dispositions best suited
to defend against threatening att�ck, are essential to avoid des
truction.

But the defensive measures should be employed so as to

permit the seizing of any opportunity to take the initiative and
to counter-attack with all the violence at one's command.

The de

fensive must always be assumed in the spirit of the offensive.

It

inay, for example, be assumed merely as a time device to gain time
to mass the necessary forces at the proper place and at the prop

er moment to commence the attack.

The offensive does not imply headlong attack.

It seeks to

bring a vigorous and timely concentration of forces against a weak
er concentration.

A splendid example of the application of the

principle of the offensive was had in the action of the Allies in
landing in North Africa in 1942, on which occasion the initiative

passed to us and our allies and remained with us for the remainder

of the war.

If the assumption of the offensive is going to comprise the

chances of carrying out a mission, it may be necessary to assume
the tactical defensive. For example,. the mission of an Escort Com

mander of getting a convoy through might well require him to
maintain a strong defensive formation and position and thus

restrict his initiative in closing and attacking a threatening :force.

Care must be exercised in assuming the offensive that one's

own force is not over-extended or dissipated to the point that an
enemy counter-attack will be successful.

The principle of the of

fensive implies a well-timed, well-coordinated attack at a decisive
point.

But it implies more than that.

It implies an attack within

the capabilities of the forces making the attack, in order that

it may be sustained and followed up.

32

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol3/iss8/3

Sustaining the offensive

RESTRICTED

10

Carmichael: Principles of War and Their Application to Strategy and Tactics

RESTRICTED
is of such importance that some military students include in the
principles of war the principle of pursuit. The success with which
the German air force pursued the break-through in the low
countries and in France in the last war and with which Montgom
ery's "Desert Rats" pursued Rommel· certainly indicate that pur
suit is a vitally important aspect of the Offensive if not deserving
of a classification as a separate Principle of War.

MASS
This principle goes by many names-superiority, concen

tration, force, and power. It does not necessarily imply an over-all
superiority in numbers. It does imply a superiority of fighting

power at a decisive point.

To enumerate all the factors of fighting power would be an

insurmountable task, but some of the main factors, as far as naval

power is concerned, are fire power and fire concentration includ

ing air power, ability to withstand punishment, maneuverability,
and, of course, the human factors, such as morale and leadership.

And, although a superiority may be enjoyed in several of the fac

tors, it may not be enough if one or more of the others is lacking.

For example, in spite of the enormous material superiority which

the Japanese enjoyed at the Battle off Samar, the poor leadership

of the Japanese Forces deprived them of an impressive tactical vic-:

tory, if not a strategic one.

MANEUVER
Movement is the means by which plans are placed into effect.

Maneuver, then, may be said to be the catalytic agent which fuses

together the other principles. By mobility, forces may accomplish
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Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950

33
11

Naval War College Review, Vol. 3 [1950], No. 8, Art. 3

RESTRICTED
mass or surprise.

It gives to the Commander flexibility and free

dom of action which he might not otherwise enjoy.

Movement does not necessarily imply rapidity, although

speed is frequently a vital factor in war.

Movement is a relative

matter, particularly in a tactical sense.. Certainly, the imp<>rtance

of thinking of movement in terms of relative movement or relative
motion need not be emphasized to officers of your experience. And,

the importance of rapid, secure, and reliable communications in

taking full advantage of the principle of movement is obvious.

Three of Jomini's four fundamental principles of strategy

are just as fundamental to naval tactics, and emphasize the enor
mous part that movement plays in the art of war:
"1.

Maneuvering

in such a manner as to engage one's major

forces against parts only of those of the enemy.

"2. In battle, by tactical

maneuvers,

bringing one's major

forces to bear on the decisive area of the battlefield or on

that part of the enemy's lines which it is important to

overwhelm.

"3. Arranging matters in such fashion that these masses of

brought to bear at the decisive place but
put into action speedily and together, so that·

men be not only
that they be

they may make a simultaneous effort."
In each of . these principles,

key to their successful application.

maneuver

and

mobility

is · the

And it is this principle of movement or mobility which gives

such strength to carrier air power,

The ability to move carriers

quickly from the South Pacific to meet the Japanese threat at Mid

way permitted our,Navyto strike a blow at the Japanese Forces of

34
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such consequences as to change the balance of nav1;1.l power in the
Pa cific and to change the complexion of the war from the strategic.

defensive to the strategic offensive. And while air power is in a
tactical sense highly mobile, it is not so in ·a strategic sense, unless ··

the enormous air base installations and logistic requirements are
available where required, or unless it is carrier borne. It is then,
from this principle of movement or mobility that naval air power
draws its great strength.

SURPRISE
Surprise may be · said to be a two-bladed weapon.

On the

one edge it is capable of inflicting great initial damage on the enetny;

on the other of affecting adversely enemy morale, sometimes to the

point of throwing· him .into complete confusion and thus making

possible his destruction before he is able to regain his balance.

Many_ things are conducive to effecting surprise--secrecy,

deception, careful planning, faultless and rapid execution.

Most

important and often the most difficult to attain is secrecy, particu

larly today with the great emphasis which is being placed on In

telligence and with the many means available to collect in
telligence.

And yet, it appears that it is still possible to effect

surprise---at least initially on a grand scale, for there is little evi

dence available to refute that the invasion of south Korea came as a
complete tactical surprise, if not as a strategic one.

This principle ma,y be applied in the nature of surprise as

time, place, force, technique, direction, and weapons employed.

to

An excellent example of naval tactical surprise as to time is

in the Battle of Savo Island, where the Japanese cruiser force
arrived on the scene much ahead of the time that it was expected

they might, if indeed they were expected at all, with the result
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that four Allied cruisers were destroyed in almost as many minutes,

before any effective fire could be returned on the Japanese
attacking force.

There are many examples where new weapons have come

as complete

tactical

surprise-tanks,

influence fuses, atomic bombs.

gas,

magnetic

mines,

Seldom, if ever, have they been

decisive in determining the outcome of the war, ev�m though it
appears that the new weapons, in some instances, might have been

capable of so doing had they been fully exploited by the power
which first had those weapons.

The difficulty arises from the

failure to employ them in mass, and from the failure to withhold

them until such time as they can be so employed on a continuing
basis.

If surprise is to be most effective, it must be employed in

conjunction with the other principles of war, particularly mass.

New weapons often present contradictions which affect materially

how and when they should be employed.

The longer they are

withheld, the greater the chance that the enemy will learn of

them, especially when they are placed in mass production and
when large numbers of personnel are engaged in training in their

employment. Furthermore, it is a gamble to divert a large portion

of one's war potential to the production and to training in the
employment

of

a

new

weapon

not

battletested.

It would

appear that in World War I, the British might have been able
to change the whole course of the war had they withheld the

tank until it was available to the Allies for use in large

numbers; or, in World War II, that the Germans might have been
able to bring England to terms had they not employed the

magnetic mine until they were able to do so in such mass as to

tie up all shipping seeking ingress or egress to the British Isles.
Instead, both of these new and revolutionary developments in

warfare were employed initially on a small scale and Before they
could be used in mass. Thus, the opponents succeeded in developing a

36
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countermeasure or a defense against them, as has always been true
when a new weapon is employed.
As for the atomic bomb or the H-bomb, weapons of mass
destruction, they can hardly be classed now as weapons of strategic
surprise by virtue of being new weapons. However, they may be
used as weapons of tactical surprise, both by us and the enemy, as
to time, place, and technique of their employment. It, therefore,
behooves us to give serious study to the offensive and defensive
tactical implications of this new weapon. Having lost its effect
iveness as a new weapon of strategic surprise, might it not be em
ployed to advantage tactically as well as strategically?
Before leaving this principle, I should like to point out that
one of the inherent strengths of sea-air power is its ability to
achieve surprise, both strategically and tactically. Mobility and
weather are two factors which greatly contribute to this ability.
Some may contend that as a result of new developments
such as long range all-weather search planes, equipped with
A. E.W., it is no longer possible.for Carrier Task Forces to.achieve
surprise. On that I should like to make these observations. The
achieving of tactical surprises will be more difficult. However, if
developments in carriers and ·carrier-based all-weather long range
attack planes and A. E. W. planes are permitted to go ahead, the
achieving of tactical surprise should stiU be possible. As for
strategic surprise, the comparative strategic mobility of carrier
based air forces, as opposed to that of great land-based air forces,
will still make it possible for carrier air power to achieve strategic
surprise. It is significant that Germany was not able to move any
appreciable amount of air power to resist the movement of the
Allies onto the beaches of Normandy.
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SECURITY
Security includes all measures to deny to the enemy the
means of gaining intelligence or of inflicting damage on own forces.
It also embraces means to obtain information about the enemy in
order to institute better security measures, such as protecting own
lines of communications.
It implies a defensive attitude, but there are occasions when
the offensive must be assumed to gain the necessary security for
own forces.

For example, the offensive was assumed in our land

ings at Guadalcanal in order to obtain security for our lines of com
munication to Australia while we were still on the strategic de
fensive.
Among the passive measures which may be essential to se
curity from a naval viewpoint are: radio silence, combat air
patrols, electronic countermeasures, air searches, ASW patrols,
radar pickets, zigzags, radio and radar intercept watches.

These

and many others may be employed to avoid the enemy's taking one's
forces by surprise and to better enable one's own forces to be pre
pared to resist attack and to counterattack effectively.
Before leaving. this principle of security, there is another
aspect thereof which is today more significant than at any time in
history since the Trojan horse; that is, security on the home front,
security against the fifth column, and security against subversion
and sabotage.

These may be the most powerful weapons in the

enemy's arsenal, unless we are forever on guard and take the of
fensive against them whenever and wherever the occasion demands.

38
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ECONOMY OF FORCE
Economy of Force implies a proper proportionment of avail

able forces both in regard to space and time.

It aims at effecting

mass at the decisive place at the proper time.

To do so may

necessitate a reduction of forces at other points to those required

to maintain the bare minimum of security. It, thus, entails a com
promise between concentration and dispersion. It should aim to ef
fect the desired concentration of own forces while, at the same time,

causing the enemy to disperse his forces.

Although economy of force does not imply, in a tactical

sense, cutting down all along the line to bare essentials, it does im

ply that in the strategic sense. For, as the scope of wars seems ever
to increase and the limit of the nation's natural resources to de

crease, it becomes more and more urgent that we weigh contin

ually· the gain against the cost and strive to proportion properly

our sources of national strength, such as manpower, critical ma
terials and industrial capacity.

Both, strategically and tactically,

the selection of proper weapons to be employed is of vital importance
in application of the principle.

Economy of force, like that of surprise, again brings out in

herent strength in sea-air power. The strength is derived, in the ap

plication of this principle, from the ability of sea-air forces to con

centrate great striking power at any one of many points about an

enemy's defensive perimeter, thus making him disperse to meet this
ever present threat. During the past war in the Pacific, the Fast

Carrier Task FoI'ces were employed on the strategic offensive (and it

should be noted that Admiral Nimitz and the Joint Chiefs opposed

any operations ':'7hich would; for an extended period, tie these forces
down to a defensive role) fThus employed, they were able not only to

inflict great material dama�e on the Japanese forces;, but, probably·
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more important, they were able �o require a wide dispersion of

enemy forces, especially air forces, and to make possible the isola
tion of any objective.

And, in spite of some contentions to the contrary that never

again will major amphibious forces be employed, circumstances and
economy of force may dictate that such a course of action is best.

In the last war with Allied troops concentrated in the Brit

ish Isles and the necessary air and naval forces available to project
them against the continent of Europe, Germany was forced to
disperse her defenses from Norway -to the southern coast of

France. Thus, both sea-air and amphibious forces permit own forces
to be concentrated, while, at the same time, requiring the en'emy
to disperse his forces.

UNITY OF COMMAND
Unity of Command implies cooperation. In fact, until recent

ly, the Army Command and Staff School called this principle the

Principle of Cooperation.

The British still do.

With the · advent of the Western Union and the Atlantic

Pact, this principle takes on a significance far greater than ever

before, for it aims at unified action, not only among armed forces

of our nation, but among all the nations with a common aim.,

It has,

as its root, a spirit of unselfishness, a feeling of confidence in leader

ship, and a desire to do, .within the limits of capabilities, what is
necessary to accomplish the objecUve without seeking for one's self,

one's ship, one's service, one's nation, any glory except that which
may accrue, in the course of eve,nts, from doing that which needs

to be done for a common cause.
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It is a principle to which we must constantly direct our at

tention. The cooperation which characterized the relations between

the United States, Britain, and the British Commonwealth Nations
during the past war was excellent.

The problem of attaining a

similar degree of cooperation and unity of command among the

twelve (12) North Atlantic Pact Nations is one of the greatest
magnitude.

1-'here is an ever growing feeling among the Atlantic Pact

Nations that Unity of Command must be effected if that Pact is

going to succeed in accomplishing its objective.

That feeling has

been expressed in recent speeches of such leaders as Mr. Churchill
and Mr. Spaak.

Cooperation, fortunately, is something which can be learned

and nurtured in our daily contacts. It is a spirit which must be de
veloped before the heat of action.

And it must be developed to

such a degree among our Allies that Unity of Command will be at
tained.

SIMPLICITY
Simplicity is a principle which may be applied to many factors

in war-among others, organization, planning, order writing, man

euver, weapon and equipment design.

It makes for order and

tends to eliminate the well known process of order-eounter
order-disorder.

Many of you will recall how our fleet maneuvers, during a

period between the two world wars, became more and more com
plicated, year by year, until we got to the point that the captain of

a capital ship needed one of two signal officers, a tactical officer and

a couple of plotters to assist and advise him in formation maneuvers,
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. and how the three or. four signal halyards were �ept, almost_ con
stantly chock-a-block with bunting.

I recall how one of our Ad

mirals used to deplore, with great rage, that tendency, and point
out that, during his tour of duty as a destroyer skipper in the

Irish Sea during World War I, the only special flags or pennants

that he ever saw were Corpen, Turn and Speed. , He said that we

must simplify our maneuvers if we ever got into action.

Our Fleet

did not appreciate that fact until we did get into a shooting war,
when it became necessary that we revise our tactical concepts; or at
least our techniques of maneuvering.

However, in the field of 'am

phibious warfare, there still remains much to be done to simplify

those inherently complicated operations.

Simplicity in order writing has many virtues.

It reduces·.

the verbiage, it reduces the load of communications, it adds to se

curity, and probably most important of all, it may give the sub

ordinate some freedom of action and permit him to use his in

itiative. One of the keys to this is to tell WHAT is to be done and
avoid telling the subordinate HOW it is to be done.

In conclusion, strategy and tactics, like war itself, are ever

changing and depend on weapons.

As new weapons become avail

able,. new strategic and tactical concepts for their emplQyment
must be evolved, and evolved quickly.

The best guides we have

available in developing these new co)?.cepts, in the absence of a

shooting war, during which they should and can be evolved and
tested, are the Principles of War-objective, offensive, mass, man,

euver, surprise, security, economy of force, unity of command, an_d
simplicity. While it may seem at times that these principles are
contradictory they are in fact complementary, the application of any

one or several of them may not assure success.
blending of them all is essential.

The necessary

But even more essential are the

human factors of morale, discipline, and leadership.
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